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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is a survey of substantive criminal law cases decided
between December 1, 1990, and December 1, 1991, excluding opinions
relating to the death penalty. Although the survey focuses on the deci-
sions of the Florida Supreme Court, selected cases from Florida's dis-
trict courts of appeal have been included, as well.
A large percentage of the Florida Supreme Court's criminal law
decisions continue to concern sentencing. Although Florida's sentencing
guidelines have been employed since October 1, 1983, it is apparent
that numerous sentencing issues remain unresolved. However, during
the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court made substantial pro-
gress towards clarifying some of these issues. In other instances,
though, the solutions offered by the Court only raise new questions.
II. SENTENCING
A. Legislative Enactments
Effective May 30, 1991, the Legislature adopted the revisions rec-
ommended by the Florida Supreme Court' in Florida Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure re: Sentencing Guidelines (Rules 3.701 and 3.988),2 con-
cerning the issues of legal status8 and victim injury points." Although
the Florida Supreme Court determined that the revisions were substan-
tive5 in nature and required legislative approval, the supreme court
1. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 270 (West), amending FLA. R. CRlM. P.
3.701(d)(6), 3.701(d)(7).
2. 576 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1991).
3. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(6).
4. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(7).
5. Florida Rules, 576 So. 2d at 1308-09 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.001(1)
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characterized the changes as clarifications of original legislative intent.6
1. Legal Constraint
The use of a so-called "multiplier" for purposes of assessing legal
status points frequently resulted in potentially draconian sanctions for
persons accused of committing multiple offenses while subject to a legal
constraint.7 By amending Rule 3.701(d)(6), of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the legislature directed that "points are to be as-
sessed only once whether there are one or more [primary or additional]
offenses at conviction." 8
The Florida Supreme Court followed its opinion in Florida Rules
with its decision in Flowers v. State.' In Flowers, the supreme court
was required to decide whether the legal constraint "multiplier" should
be applied to offenses occurring before May 30, 1991, the effective date
of the substantive amendments to Rule 3.701(d)(6). The supreme court
first determined that "Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(6)
and 3.988 do not address the use of a multiplier when calculating legal
constraint points."1 However, by applying the principle of lenity found
in section 775.021(1) of the Florida Statutes,"1 the supreme court con-
cluded that the use of a "multiplier" is inappropriate.
2. Victim Injury
The recent legislative amendments recommended by the supreme
court in Florida Rules also clarified the assessment of victim injury
points, pursuant to Rule 3.701(d)(7) of the Florida Rules of Criminal
(1989)).
6. Id. at 1309.
7. See Scott v. State, 574 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the
trial court's assessment of legal constraint points for each of 24 offenses committed
while on probation, thereby resulting in a recommended sentence of life imprisonment).
8. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.701(d)(6), as amended, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 270
(West), pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re: Sentencing Guidelines
(Rules 3.701 and 3.988), 576 So. 2d 1307, 1309-10 (Fla. 1991).
9. 586 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1991).
10. Id. at 1059.
11. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (Supp. 1988) provides: "The provisions of this code
and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is
susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the ac-
cused." See Lambert v. State, 545 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1989) (applying the principle of
lenity found in Florida Statutes section 775.021(1) to the sentencing guidelines).
1991]
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Procedure. That amendment provides that for offenses occurring after
May 30, 1991, victim injury points are properly assessed not only for
each victim physically injured during a criminal offense, but for each
count resulting in injury, regardless of the number of counts or
victims.12
Based upon the fact that the supreme court in Flowers concluded
that the principle of lenity in section 775.021(1) applies to the sentenc-
ing guidelines, it seems appropriate that victim injury points should be
scored differently depending upon whether an offense occurs before
May 30, 1991, the effective date of Chapter 91-270.13 On the other
hand, this result is made less clear by the Florida Supreme Court's
observation in Florida Rules that the Florida Sentencing Guidelines
Commission "never intended"1 4 for victim injury to be scored only
once, in instances of multiple offenses against the same victim.15
B. Scoresheet Errors
In Goene v. State,1 6 the Florida Supreme Court determined that
principles of double jeopardy are not violated when a defendant is re-
sentenced to an increased term where the defendant affirmatively mis-
represented his identity during sentencing. The defendant in Goene re-
ceived a guideline sentence of four and one-half years imprisonment for
the offenses of armed robbery, false imprisonment, and carrying a con-
12. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(7), as amended, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 270
(West) (amendment pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re: Sentencing
Guidelines (Rules 3.701 & 3.988), 576 So. 2d 1307, 1310 (Fla. 1991) [hereinafter
Florida Rules].
13. For offenses occurring prior to May 30, 1991, recent cases have consistently
concluded that it is error to score victim injury twice for the same victim, regardless of
the number of offenses committed against that victim. Weekly v. State, 553 So. 2d 239
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. State, 565 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Stermer v. State, 567 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Gordon v.
State, 575 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
14. Florida Rules, 576 So. 2d at 1308.
15. In an asterisk near the conclusion of their opinion, the supreme court added:
Of course, if the Legislature approves the amendments, they then must be
accorded the same legal status as any other express clarification of original
legislative intent. Our opinion today is not meant to deny that the propos-
als in Appendix B are in fact a clarification, only to say that they will
become a clarification only if and when the Legislature approves them.
Id. at 1309.
16. 577 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1991).
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cealed weapon. At his sentencing hearing, the defendant represented to
the trial court that. Edwin Goene was his real name.
After Goene had commenced the service of his sentence, the state
received information that the defendant had an extensive criminal his-
tory under his true name, Russell Dean Gorham, and properly scored
twelve to seventeen years imprisonment under the sentencing guide-
lines. Accordingly, the trial court resentenced the defendant to a term
of seventeen years imprisonment.
The Florida Supreme Court rejected Goene's contention that his
resentencing violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Instead,
the supreme court concluded that the defendant's affirmative misrepre-
sentation of his identity constituted a fraud upon the trial court, and
that "orders, judgments or decrees which are the product of fraud, de-
ceit, or collusion 'may be vacated, modified, opened or otherwise acted
upon at any time.' "17
In Manuel v. State,18 the Second District Court of Appeal read
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Goene narrowly. The defend-
ant in Manuel appeared before the trial court for a violation of com-
munity control. After the imposition of the defendant's original com-
munity control sentence, the state discovered several additional prior
convictions obtained by the defendant under aliases. Utilizing a cor-
rected scoresheet prepared by the state, the trial court sentenced the
defendant to five years' incarceration for the community control
violation.
On appeal, the court reversed the defendant's sentence, and re-
manded for resentencing in accordance with the defendant's original
scoresheet. Citing the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Goene, the
Manuel court concluded that the defendant was entitled to sentencing
under the original, and incorrect, scoresheet, in the absence of evidence
that the defendant "took any affirmative action to mislead the trial
court as to his prior record." 19
C. Consolidated Sentencing Hearings
Rule 3.701(d)(1), of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, re-
quires that "[o]ne guideline scoresheet shall be utilized for each de-
17. Id. at 1309 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Burton, 314 So. 2d 136,
138 (Fla. 1975).
18. 582 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
19. Id. at 824.
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fendant covering all offenses pending before the court for sentencing.12 0
No definition of the term "pending" is provided by the Rule 3.701. On
the other hand, Rule 3.720 requires the court to order a sentencing
hearing "[a]s soon as practicable after the determination of guilt and
after the examination of any presentence reports."'"
In Clark v. State,2 the defendant was found guilty of sale and
possession of cocaine on November 19, 1986, after a trial by jury. On
November 21, 1986, the defendant was brought to trial in a separate
case before a different judge in the same circuit. During the jury's de-
liberations in the second trial, the judge in the first case sentenced the
defendant to a guideline sentence of four years' incarceration, without
objection by the defendant.
After the jury in the defendant's second trial also returned verdicts
of guilty, the defendant was again sentenced to four years' incarcera-
tion. However, the trial court directed that the defendant serve the sec-
ond four-year sentence consecutively to the sentence imposed two days
earlier. Again, the defendant failed to object.
In Clark, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that unless a de-
fendant can show that a postponement of sentencing would not result in
"unreasonable delay," 23 an offense should generally be considered
pending for purposes of Rule 3.701(d)(1) only if "a verdict of guilt or
plea of guilty or nolo contendere has been obtained. ' 4 The supreme
court specifically placed the burden on the defendant to request a "con-
solidated sentencing ' 25 hearing, and cautioned that the defendant's
failure to raise a timely objection would constitute "a procedural bar
for appellate review." 2
As guidelines, the supreme court suggested that unreasonable de-
lay would result in instances where sentencing "might be postponed for
an extended period of time-for example, for many months, 27 as jux-
taposed by situations where a defendant's second case is "likely" to be
pending for sentencing "within the same day or week." '28
Applying this approach, the supreme court in Clark concluded
20. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(1).
21. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.720.
22. 572 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1991).
23. Id. at 1391.
24. Id. at 1390-91.
25. Id. at 1391.
26. Id.
27. Clark, 572 So. 2d at 1391.
28. Id.
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that the defendant was entitled to a consolidated sentencing hearing.
However, the supreme court determined that the defendant was proce-
durally barred from raising the issue on appeal.29 Although the su-
preme court had little difficulty reaching this result, their opinion was
less equivocal concerning other matters. For example, the supreme
court failed to suggest what result is appropriate when a defendant's
second case is not "likely" to be completed within "the same day or
week," but "might" be concluded in less than "many months."30
D. Departure Sentences
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court issued sev-
eral decisions concerning the propriety of various departure sentences.
In a related issue, the supreme court modified its holding in Ree v.
State,"' by slightly relaxing the requirement that written reasons be
filed contemporaneous with a guidelines departure sentence.32
29. The supreme court stated:
The burden falls on the defendant to assert a desire for simultaneous sen-
tencing and to demonstrate to the sentencing court's satisfaction that such
a sentencing will not result in an unreasonable delay. This, Clark failed to
do. Accordingly, the issue now is procedurally barred.
Id.
30. Aside from the supreme court's unfortunate reliance on terms such as
"likely" or "might," other problems are apparent, as well. For example, does a defend-
ant's demand for speedy trial in a second prosecution constitute sufficient grounds to
postpone sentencing in the defendant's first case. If so, are constitutional concerns ade-
quately safeguarded by presenting a defendant with the "Hobson's choice" of either
foregoing adequate discovery in a second prosecution, or waiving the right to a consoli-
dated sentencing hearing, and concurrent sentences, in each of the defendant's "pend-
ing" cases. See State v. Frank, 573 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (a
defendant cannot be forced to choose between the independently guaranteed right to
discovery and the right to a speedy trial); Harris v. Moe, 538 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (same); State ex rel. Wright v. Yawn, 320 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (same).
On the other hand, what result is appropriate where an "unreasonable delay" in a
defendant's second prosecution is attributable to supplemental discovery provided by
the state, or by the filing of additional charges, or delay caused by the unavailability of
a state witness, or defense witness?
31. 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990).
32. See Pamela Cole Bell, Substantive Criminal Law, 15 NOVA L. REv. 1037,
1039 (1991).
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1. Contemporaneous Writing Requirement
In State v. Lyles,"3 the supreme court determined that the contem-
poraneous writing requirement of Ree was satisfied where, at sentenc-
ing, the court made oral findings in support of its departure sentence,
which were "reduced to writing without substantive change on the
same date." ' It cautioned, however, that even "a few days"35 delay in
entering written reasons would not be considered contemporaneous. 6
2. Nonscoreable Juvenile Convictions
Juvenile convictions may be scored as prior record only if the dis-
position date of the juvenile offense occurred within three years from
the date of a defendant's primary offense at conviction. 7 However, in
instances where juvenile convictions are too remote in time to be in-
cluded as prior record, they may be considered as a basis for departure
from the sentencing guidelines.38
In Puffinberger v. State,39 the Florida Supreme Court clarified
when, and to what extent, a defendant's nonscoreable juvenile convic-
tions may be used as a basis for departure from the sentencing guide-
lines. Initially, the supreme court in Puffinberger concluded that "mini-
mal or insignificant juvenile dispositions"4 are insufficient grounds to
serve as a basis for departure from the guidelines. On the other hand,
the Puffinberger court reasoned that a "significant" '41 juvenile record
would support a departure sentence.
In determining what is "significant," the supreme court directed
33. 576 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1991).
34. Id. at 708.
35. Id. at 709.
36. The supreme court also concluded that the "ministerial act" of filing the
written departure order with the clerk of the court on the first business day after the
defendant's sentencing hearing resulted in no prejudice and complied with Ree. Id. The
Fifth District Court of Appeal subsequently extended this aspect of the Florida Su-
preme Court's decision in Lyles to a case where the written reasons for departure were
not filed with the clerk of the court until three business days after sentencing. Rodwell
v. State, 588 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
37. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(5)(c).
38. See Weems v. State, 469 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1985).
39. 581 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1991).
40. Id. at 899; see Crocker v. State, 581 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1991).
41. Id.
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that not only the "number," but the "nature and seriousness" 42 of the
juvenile: offenses must be examined.' s However, the Puffinberger court
concluded that any departure is "per se invalid" to the extent that it
exceeds the maximum sentence a defendant could have received had
the juvenile dispositions been scored as prior record. 44
3. Escalating Patterns of Criminal Activity
Shortly after the establishment of the sentencing guidelines, the
Florida Supreme Court determined in Keys v. State45 that an "escala-
tion from crimes against property to violent crimes against persons"
constitutes a sufficient basis for departure from the sentencing guide-
lines."" [n Williams v. State,4" the Florida Supreme Court determined
42. Id.
43. The supreme court offered some guidance in defining the term "significant,"
stating: "lA]n unscored juvenile record is significant for departure purposes if the rec-
ord is extensive or serious, or if the number and nature of the dispositions, when consid-
ered in combination, amount to a significant record under the circumstances." Id. at
899.
The supreme court also determined that Puffinberger's three nonscoreable bur-
glary convictions were not "significant," and therefore, could not be used by the trial
court as a basis for enhancing Puffinberger's presumptive guidelines sentence for the
offense of aggravated child abuse.
In concluding that Puffinberger's juvenile record was not "significant," the su-
preme court examined seemingly every facet of Puffinberger's juvenile record, noting
that Puffinberger: 1) burglarized his parents home on each occasion; 2) all three bur-
glaries occurred within a ten-day period; 3) Puffinberger was again living at home
when he plead guilty to each of the three burglaries; 4) the victim, Puflinberger's fa-
ther, cosigned the defendant's plea forms; 5) Puffinberger was required to make restitu-
tion for unrecovered items as a condition of his sentence. Id. at 900.
44. Id. at 899. But see FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (Supp. 1990) which provides in
pertinent part: "The extent of departure from a guideline sentence shall not be subject
to appellate review."
45. 500 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1986).
46. Id. at 136. The holding in Keys was codified by the legislature in FLA. STAT.
§ 921.001(8) (1987):
A trial court may impose a sentence outside the guidelines when credible
facts proven by a preponderance of the evidence demonstrate that the de-
fendant's prior record, including offenses for which adjudication was with-
held, and the current criminal offense for which the defendant is being
sentenced indicate an escalating pattern of criminal conduct. The escalat-
ing pattern of criminal conduct may be evidenced by a progression from
nonviolent crimes to violent crimes or a progression of increasingly violent
crimes.
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that a pattern of "increasingly serious" nonviolent criminal activity
may also constitute a valid basis for departure from the sentencing
guidelines.4 8
4. Continuing and Persistent Patterns of Criminal Conduct
The Florida Supreme Court has consistently concluded that the
"timing ' 49 or "temporal proximity"60 of a defendant's prior offenses
may, under certain circumstances, constitute a valid basis for departure
from the sentencing guidelines, where the offenses demonstrate a "con-
tinuing and persistent pattern of criminal activity." 5' 1 Unfortunately,
the circumstances required to sustain such a departure have continued
to avoid easy definition.
In the 1988 decision of Jones v. State,52 the supreme court deter-
mined that before the temporal proximity of a defendant's offenses
could serve as a valid basis for departure from the sentencing
guidelines:
it must be shown that the crimes committed demonstrate a defend-
ant's involvement in a continuing and persistent pattern of criminal
activity as evidenced by the timing of each offense in relation to
prior offenses and the release from incarceration or other
supervision.s
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court referred to its earlier
decision in Williams v. State (Williams J),54 and emphasized that the
47. 581 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1991).
48. Id. at 146. In Williams, the defendant's prior record consisted of fifteen mis-
demeanor convictions, followed by a conviction for the offense of grand theft, a third
degree felony. The defendant was then placed on probation by the trial court for the
offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a second degree felony.
When Williams violated his probationary sentence, the trial court departed from
the sentencing guidelines, relying upon the defendant's escalating pattern of criminal
conduct. See infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text. The Florida Supreme Court
approved the trial court's departure sentence based upon Williams' pattern of increas-
ingly serious nonviolent criminal activity. Williams, 581 So. 2d at 146.
49. State v. Simpson, 554 So. 2d 506, 510 (Fla. 1989).
50. State v. Jones, 530 So. 2d 53, 56 (Fla. 1988).
51. Id.
52. 530 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1988).
53. Id. at 56.
54. 504 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1987).
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defendant's conduct must demonstrate a "definite pattern." 5 The su-
preme court's opinion failed, however, to suggest that any escalation in
the severity of the defendant's offenses was necessary to support a de-
parture sentence.
Subsequent to Jones, the supreme court concluded in State v.
Simpson" that the "timing" 57 of a defendant's offenses may serve as
grounds for departure from the sentencing guidelines "if based on facts
that demonstrate the type of escalating or persistent pattern described
with approval in Keys, Williams I, Rousseau and Jones."58
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court again revis-
ited this issue in State v. Smith,5 and in their opinion, cited to their
earlier decision in State v. Simpson, and quoted from Jones v. State.
Discussing Simpson, the supreme court stated that "we suggested that
the temporal proximity of crimes could, under some circumstances, be
grounds for departure." 60 Without articulating precisely what "circum-
stances" are necessary to support such a departure sentence, the Smith
court determined that the defendant's commission of the offenses of
grand theft, petit theft, and resisting arrest without violence-only
thirty days after release from incarceration-was not a sufficient basis
to support a departure from the sentencing guidelines. The Smith court
specifically noted that all of defendant's crimes were "nonviolent prop-
erty crimes with no substantial escalation in severity."' Although their
decision quoted the "temporal proximity" language of Simpson and
Jones, the supreme court nevertheless concluded that "one successive
criminal episode of no greater significance than the first, even though
committed only thirty days after release from incarceration, is not a
sufficient reason to depart from the guidelines." '
55. Jones, 530 So. 2d at 56.
56. 554 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1989).
57. Id. at 510.
58. Id. (citations omitted in original). The citations to Jones, Williams I, Rous-
seau, and Keys are as follows: State v. Jones, 530 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1988); Williams v.
State, 504 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1987); State v. Rousseau, 509 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1987); Keys
v. State, 500 So. 134 (Fla. 1986).
It is unclear why the supreme court in Simpson mixed the terms "escalating" and
"persistent." Each term had historically referred to a separate and distinct basis for
departure.
59. 579 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1991).
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 77.
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In the final analysis, then, it is unclear based upon the supreme
court's decisions in Jones, Simpson, and now Smith, exactly what fac-
tors are necessary, and should be considered, when examining whether
the timing of an individual's offenses support a departure sentence. The
supreme court's decision in Jones suggests that where a definite pattern
exists, a defendant's continuing and persistent criminal activity need
not necessarily escalate in severity to give rise to a departure sentence.
On the other hand, Smith suggests that an escalation in severity, com-
bined with the temporal proximity of the defendant's offenses, may give
rise to a departure, regardless of whether the defendant has exhibited a
persistent pattern of criminal conduct.63
5. Professional Manner
In Hernandez v. State," the Florida Supreme Court determined
that a departure sentence may never be based upon the "professional"
manner of a criminal act. The Hernandez court found the term "pro-
fessionalism" incapable of easy definition, and simply "too vague" a
basis upon which to substantiate a departure sentence." Alternatively,
the supreme court reasoned that to the extent "professionalism" relates
to a defendant's background or experience, this factor is already
weighed into the sentencing guidelines, based upon a defendant's prior
record.66
6. Probation and Community Control Sentences
In recent years, the Florida Supreme Court has consistently con-
63. Simpson appears to suggest that either possibility is correct. See supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text.
Because of the lack of clarity in the Jones-Simpson-Smith line of cases, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision in Smith will undoubtedly cause confusion for the district
courts of appeal. See Wilson v. State, 573 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(concluding that a departure sentence may be based upon the temporal proximity of a
defendant's offenses, without any showing of an escalation in the seriousness of the
offenses, "notwithstanding language in Smith which might arguably be taken
otherwise").
64. 575 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1991).
65. Id. at 642.
66. Id. Citing its earlier decision in Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla.
1985), the supreme court concluded that "Florida law now is settled that a departure
may not be based on any matter already factored into the guidelines' computations."
Id. at 641.
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cluded that it is improper to impose a departure sentence following a
violation of probation. 67 However, in Williams v. State,68 the supreme
court concluded that a departure sentence may be imposed following a
violation of probation if the legal basis for the departure existed at the
time the offender was originally placed on probation."
The supreme court reasoned that their earlier decisions in Lambert
v. State,7 ' and Ree v. State," prohibited only those departure sentences
which relied upon conduct occurring during the defendant's probation-
ary sentence, as opposed to reasons for departure which existed at the
time the defendant was originally sentenced.7 2 As a matter of policy,
the sup:reme court expressed concern that efforts to curtail the discre-
tionary authority of the courts following a probation violation might
discourage courts from imposing probationary sentences. 73
Following the Williams opinion, the supreme court rejected a post-
probation violation departure sentence in State v. Johnson.7 , The de-
fendant in Johnson received a split sentence, 7  and subsequently vio-
lated the probationary portion of that sentence. Upon revoking the de-
fendant's probation, the trial court imposed a departure sentence. As a
basis for the departure, the trial court relied upon conduct which oc-
curred (luring the defendant's probationary sentence-the same prac-
tice prohibited in Williams.
Without citing Williams, the supreme court instead discussed and
rejected the theory that departure sentences could be based upon "non-
67. Ree v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990); Lambert v. State, 545 So. 2d 838
(Fla. 1989).
68. 581 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1991); see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 146. Although the supreme court's decision failed to specifically ad-
dress the issue, it logically follows that the holding in Williams pertains to offenders
placed on community control.
70. 545 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1989).
71. 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990).
72. Williams, 581 So. 2d at 145-46.
73. Id. at 146. The supreme court found additional support for their holding in
FLA. STAT. § 948.06(1) (1987) which provides in part:
If probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the
probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admit-
ted, unless he has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sen-
tence which it might have originally imposed before placing the proba-
tioner on probation or the offender into community control.
74. :585 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1991).
75. See generally Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988) (describing the
various types of split sentences recognized in Florida).
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criminal" violations occurring during a defendant's probationary sen-
tence.7 6 It reasoned that "[t]his construction would require us to over-
rule both Franklin and Poore,"' '  and added that "[i]t would be
incongruous to permit guideline departures for noncriminal probation
violations but prohibit departures for new criminal conduct. '7 8
Curiously, the supreme court's opinion in Johnson failed to make
any reference whatsoever to its decision in Williams.7 9 Equally odd was
its failure in Johnson to cite Ree v. State,8 the other cased relied upon
in Williams.
One explanation is an implicit recognition by the supreme court in
Johnson that the rationale in Williams is inapplicable to cases involv-
ing split sentences. Williams stands for the proposition that a departure
sentence may be imposed following a violation of probation if the legal
basis for the departure existed at the time the offender was originally
placed on probation. Johnson, on the other hand, implies that a trial
court may never depart from the sentencing guidelines when a defend-
ant violates the probationary portion of a split sentence, regardless of
whether valid reasons existed for a departure sentence at the time the
offender was originally placed on probation.81
This reading of Johnson is directly supported by the supreme
court's earlier decision in Franklin v. State,8" which discussed sentenc-
ing options following violations of a true split sentence and a probation-
ary split sentence. In both instances, the Franklin court concluded on
the authority of Lambert v. State8" and Rule 3.701(d)(14) of the Flor-
ida Rules of Criminal Procedure,84 that departure sentence were
76. Johnson, 585 So. 2d at 273.
77. Id. (citing Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1989); Poore v. State, 531
So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)).
78. Id.
79. Williams was decided on May 30, 1991 and Johnson on August 22, 1991.
80. 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990).
81. If this reading of Johnson is correct, split sentences remain a safe harbor for
defendants seeking to avoid the types of post-probation violation departure sentences
approved in Williams.
82. 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1989).
83. Id. at 838.
84. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(14) provides:
Sentences imposed after revocation of probation or community control
must be in accordance with the guidelines. The sentence imposed after
revocation of probation or community control may be included within the
original cell (guidelines range) or may be increased to the next higher cell
(guidelines range) without requiring a reason for departure.
[Vol. 16
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prohibited. 85
E. Modifications of Probation or Community Control
In Clark v. State,86 the Florida Supreme Court determined that
before a probation or community control sentence may-be enhanced,
"either by extension of the period or by addition of terms, ' 87 an of-
fender must be 1) formally charged; 2) brought before the court; and
3) advised of the charge, in accordance with the procedures in section
948.06 of the Florida Statutes. 8 The supreme court concluded that
"[absent proof of a violation,"89 a court may not enhance an offenders
probationary or community control sentence, even where the defendant
and the probation or community control officer agree to the modifica-
tion in writing, and waive notice and hearing. 90
But see Williams v. State, 581 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1991).
85. Concerning true split sentences, the supreme court in Franklin stated:
Upon the violation of probation after incarceration, the judge may resen-
tence the defendant to any period of time not exceeding the remaining
balance of the withheld or suspended portion of the original sentence, pro-
vided that the total period of incarceration, including time already served,
may not exceed the one-cell upward increase permitted by Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(14). Any further departure for violation of
probation is not allowed. Lambert v. State.
Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851, 852-53 (Fla. 1989) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
The Court reached the same result regarding probationary split sentences:
Upon a violation of probation during a probationary split sentence, a trial
court may resentence the defendant to any term falling within the original
guidelines range, including the one-cell upward increase. However, no fur-
ther increase or departure is permitted for any reason. Lambert.
Id. at 853 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
86. 579 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1991).
87. Id. at 110.
88. Id. at 110-111.
89. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
90. Id. In a footnote, the supreme court stated:
We recognize that section 948.03(7), Florida Statutes (1987), permits the
court to "rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions thereto-
fore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in community control."
However, that statute is not applicable here because the court did not
modify a term or condition previously imposed. Rather, it added an en-
tirely new condition to the order of community control.
Id. at 110 n.3.
The court's reasoning seems less convincing when considered in conjunction with
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F. Youthful Offender Sentences
In Kepner v. State,91 the Florida Supreme Court examined the
language and amendments to section 958.04(3) of the Florida Statutes,
concerning the sentencing of youthful offenders. 2 The supreme court
determined that section 958.04(3) allows for three possible results, de-
pending upon an offender's guidelines scoresheet, and the sentence im-
posed by the court. While emphasizing in their opinion that the maxi-
mum youthful offender sentence is six years, the supreme court
concluded in a multi-part holding:
First, if the recommended guidelines sentence exceeds six years
• ..and the court sentences the youthful offender to six years of
sanctions, written reasons for a sentence less than the recom-
mended guidelines sentence are not required. Second, if the recom-
mended guidelines sentence is less than .. .six years, the court
must sentence within the guidelines or give written reasons for the
departure whether upward or downward. Third, if the recom-
mended sentence is six years or greater and the court imposes a
[sentence of] ... less than six years, the court must provide written
the first sentence of FLA. STAT. § 948.03(7) (1987). The language quoted by the su-
preme court comes exclusively from the second sentence of that section. Read together,
the first two sentences of section 948.03(7) provide:
The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not pre-
vent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers
proper. The court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and condi-
tions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in commu-
nity control.
FLA. STAT. § 948.03(7) (1987) (emphasis added).
Other portions of this section have subsequently been amended and renumbered as
FLA. STAT. § 948.03(8) (Supp. 1990).
91. 577 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1991).
92. FLA. STAT. § 958.04(3) (1985) provided:
The provisions of this section shall not be used to impose a greater sen-
tence than the maximum recommended range as established by statewide
sentencing guidelines pursuant to s. 921.001 unless clear and convincing
reasons are explained in writing by the trial court judge. A sentence im-
posed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal by the defend-
ant pursuant to s. 924.06.
Portions of both sentences in this section were subsequently amended. The supreme
court's decision in Kepner concerned the changes to the final sentence of FLA. STAT. §
958.04(3) (1987) which was amended to provide: "A sentence imposed outside of such
guidelines shall be subject to appeal pursuant to s. 924.06 or s. 924.07."
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/6
Koerner
reasons for departure. 3
The supreme court in Kepner specifically recognized that a youthful
offender sentence is an "alternative sentence." 94 However, the holding
in Kepner makes the sentencing guidelines applicable to the extent pro-
vided above, with one caveat-unlike other sentencing schemes within
the guidelines, the supreme court's rationale necessarily considers
"sanctions" to include probation and community control. In all other
instances under the sentencing guidelines, probation and community
control cannot be used interchangeably, or in lieu of incarceration, in-
sofar as each is a different type of "sanction" for purposes of the sen-
tencing guidelines.
G. Alternative Sentencing Provisions
Several recent decisions of the district courts of appeal have ad-
dressed the conflict between the mandatory minimum sentencing provi-
sion contained in section 893.13(l)(e)(1), Florida Statutes,95 relating to
the manufacture, sale, or purchase of controlled substances within one
thousand feet of a school, and section 397.12, Florida Statutes, which is
an alternative sentencing provision for drug offenders."0 Section 397.12
93. 5,77 So. 2d at 578.
94. Id.; see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. See generally FLA. STAT.
§ 958.04 (Supp. 1990).
95. This section provides that individuals convicted of various offenses, including
the manufacture, sale, or purchase of controlled substances such as cocaine within 1000
feet of a school are:
guilty of a felony of the first degree . . . and shall be sentenced to a mini-
mum term of imprisonment of 3 calendar years and shall not be eligible
for parole or release under the Control Release Authority . . .or statutory
gain-time . . . prior to serving such minimum sentence.
FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(e)(1) (Supp. 1990).
96. FLA. STAT. § 397.12 (1989) provides:
When any person, including any juvenile, has been charged with or con-
victed of a violation of any provision of chapter 893 or of a violation of any
law committed under the influence of a controlled substance, the court,
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Department of Correc-
tions, or Parole Commission, whichever has jurisdiction over that person,
may in its discretion require the person charged or convicted to participate
in a drug treatment program licensed by the department under the provi-
sions of this chapter. If referred by the court, the referral may be in lieu of
or in addition to final adjudication, imposition of any penalty or sentence,
or any other similar action. If the accused desires final adjudication, his
1991]
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permits courts to require persons charged or convicted of a violation
relating to controlled substances to participate in a licensed drug treat-
ment program, "in lieu of or in addition to final adjudication, imposi-
tion of any penalty or sentence. '97
With some reservations," the Fourth District Court of Appeal has
consistently held that the alternative sentencing scheme provided by
section 397.12 may not be used to avoid the mandatory minimum sen-
tencing language contained in section 893.13(l)(e)(1)." Several rea-
sons were offered. First, section 397.12 provides an alternative sentenc-
ing option only for persons charged with the possession of controlled
substances, as opposed to purchasing offenses."' 0 Additionally, it is un-
likely that the legislature intended that simple drug addiction should
overcome the mandatory provisions of section 893.13(1)(e)(). °1 Fi-
constitutional right to trial shall not be denied. The court may consult with
or seek the assistance of any agency, public or private, or any person con-
cerning such a referral. Assignment to a drug program may be contingent
upon budgetary considerations and availability of space.
97. Id.
98. State v. Liataud, 587 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (An-
stead, J., specially concurring) ("[T]his is another case of the left hand of the legisla-
ture not knowing what the right hand is doing."); State v. Scates, 585 So. 2d 385 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (question certified); State v. Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly
D2628 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); State v. Vola, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2246,
2249 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Anstead, J., specially concurring) ("[T]he legislature's
intent to see persons such as the appellee receive treatment is obviously being thwarted
by our reversal of the trial judge's order.").
99. State v. Baxter, 581 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Lane, 582 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Baumgardner, 587 So. 2d
1147 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Liataud, 587 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2038 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Scates, 585 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Greisdorf, 587
So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Vola, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2246
(4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Kalogeras, 587 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991); State v. Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2628 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
100. Baxter, 581 So. 2d at 938; Lane, 582 So. 2d at 78; Vola, 16 Fla. L. Weekly
at D2247; Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at D2628. This argument is derived from the
language of FLA. STAT. § 397.011(2) (1989) which provides in pertinent part:
For a violation of any provision of chapter 893 . . . relating to possession
of any substance regulated thereby, the trial judge may, in his discretion,
require the defendant to participate in a drug treatment program . . . pur-
suant to the provisions of this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. Vola, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at D2247. This line of analysis further reasons that
the minimum mandatory sentencing provision in section 893.13(1)(e)(l) was promul-
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nally, pursuant to Rule 3.701(d)(9), of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, mandatory sentences take precedence over guideline
sentences. 102
H. Habitual Offender Sentences
During the survey period, two closely related issues concerning the
habitual felony offender statute divided the district courts of appeal.
Both issues concern the meaning of section 775.084(4)(a)(1), Florida
Statutes, which provides: "The court . ..shall sentence the habitual
felony offender as follows: 1. In the case of a felony of the first degree,
for life."
On the one hand, the district courts of appeal have reached con-
trary conclusions concerning whether section 775.084(4)(a)(1) permits
trial courts to impose habitual felony offender sanctions for individuals
convicted of first degree felonies punishable by life. Some courts have
determined such offenders are not subject to habitual felony offender
sanctions. Other courts have reached a contrary result.103
On the other hand, the district courts of appeal have issued con-
flicting decisions concerning whether section 775.084(4)(a)(1) is
mandatory or permissive in nature. Some courts have decided that sec-
tion 775.084(4)(a)(1) permits the imposition of sentences of less than
life in prison, as an habitual offender, where the offender is convicted of
gated more recently, and therefore, evinces the intent of the legislature. Id.; accord
Lane, 582 So. 2d at 78.
102. Baxter, 581 So. 2d at 938; Jenkins, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at D2628. FLA. R.
CRIM P. 3.701(d)(9) provides:
Mandatory sentences: For those offenses having a mandatory penalty, a
scoresheet should be completed and the guideline sentence calculated. If
the recommended sentence is less than the mandatory penalty, the
mandatory sentence takes precedence. If the guideline sentence exceeds
the mandatory sentence, the guideline sentence should be imposed.
103. Compare Gholston v. State, 589 So. 2d 307, 307 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990) ("[sjection 775.084, Florida Statutes, makes no provision for enhancing penal-
ties for first-degree felonies punishable by life, life felonies, or capital felonies"); John-
son v. State, 568 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (same) and Power v. State,
568 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (same) with Paige v. State, 570 So. 2d
1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (first degree felonies punishable by life are subject
to enhancement under habitual felony offender statute); Swain v. State, 579 So. 2d 842
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Westbrook v. State, 574 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (question certified) and Ford v. State, 586 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (question certified).
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a first degree felony. These courts reason that the language contained
in section 775.084(4)(a)(1) is permissive, rather than mandatory.
Other courts have disagreed, finding the statute's language
mandatory.10'
I. Restitution
In State v. Hawthorne,105 the Florida Supreme Court refined the
analysis for determining the value of property in restitution hearings.10 6
In those instances when "the value of property is an essential element
of a crime, ' 10 7 value is determined as the market value of the property
on the date of the offense.108 In this regard, fair market value of an
item should be derived from "direct testimony or through evidence of
the four factors announced by the supreme court in Negron."'0 9
In other instances, though, the standard method of determining
value is inadequate. In these situations, "a court is not tied to fair mar-
ket value as the sole standard for determining restitution amounts, but
rather may exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes
of restitution." 1 0 Examples might include the theft of a family heir-
loom, new automobiles-which immediately depreciate in value after
purchase-or property which has undergone restoration, and thus, has
104. Compare State v. Fannin, 578 So. 2d 471, 471 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991) ("section 775.084(4)(a) mandates a life sentence in the case of felonies of the
first degree," but question certified); Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (same) and Walsingham v. State, 576 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (same) (question certified) with Henry v. State, 581 So. 2d 928, 929 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("the 'shall sentence' provision of the habitual offender statute
• ..is permissive, not mandatory"); Cotton v. State, 588 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) and Smith v. State, 16 Fla. L. Weekly DI51 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
105. 573 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991).
106. See generally FLA. STAT. § 775.089 (1989).
107. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 332 (citing Negron, 306 So. 2d at 108).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 333 (footnote omitted). The four factors used to determine the appro-
priate market value in Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974), receded from on
other grounds, Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980), were summarized
by the supreme court as follows: "(1) original market cost; (2) manner in which the
item was used; (3) the general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the percent-
age of depreciation." Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 332.
110. Id. at 333. As authority for this proposition, the supreme court looked to
FLA. STAT. § 775.089(6) (1987) which includes reference to the fact that the court
"shall consider ...such other factors which it deems appropriate." Id.
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not depreciated in value since the time of purchase.'
III. DEFENSES
A. Entrapment
1. Entrapment as a Matter of Law
In State v. Hunter,"2 the Florida Supreme Court determined that
the objective entrapment standard established in Cruz v. State" s was
not superseded by section 777.201."1 The supreme court's conclusion
was predicated upon an implicit recognition that constitutional consid-
erations of due process cannot be superseded by statutory enactment,1 1 5
combined with an explicit recognition that, "[b]y focusing on police
conduct," the objective entrapment aspects of their decision in Cruz
"includes due process considerations.""' 6
The: facts in Hunter were typical of many drug transactions. First,
111. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 333 nn.4-5. The facts in Hawthorne concerned
the theft of an older car that had been repaired shortly before it was stolen, but was
otherwise in good working condition. As a result of the theft, the car was destroyed.
Although the vehicle had been purchased by the victim for $1,530 14 months prior to
the theft, the supreme court, cognizant of the repairs made to the vehicle and the fact
that the car was in good working condition, approved the trial court's award of $1,500
restitution.
112. 586 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1991).
113. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985).
114. Following the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Cruz, the legislature en-
acted FLA. STAT. § 777.201 (1987) which states in pertinent part:
(1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with a law
enforcement officer, or a person acting as an agent of a law enforcement
officer perpetrates an entrapment if, for the purpose of obtaining evidence
of the commission of a crime, he induces or encourages and, as a direct
result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such crime
by employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a sub-
stantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one
who is ready to commit it.
(2) A person prosecuted for a crime shall be acquitted if he proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that his criminal conduct occurred as a re-
sult of an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier
of fact.
115. See Strickland v. State, 588 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(concluding in light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Hunter that "Cruz is
still alive and well").
116. Hunter, 586 So. 2d at 322.
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an individual named Ron Diamond agreed to perform substantial assis-
tance' 17 for the police in exchange for a reduction of sentence in his
drug trafficking conviction. Diamond approached Kelly Conklin, who
was not involved in any ongoing criminal activity, seeking to purchase
drugs. Conklin, after much persistence from Diamond, turned to the
defendant, David Hunter for assistance. Through a friend, Hunter was
able to produce drugs to sell to Diamond. On the day of the sale, both
Conklin and Hunter were arrested. Because Conklin had not been en-
gaged any specific, ongoing criminal activity, the Court concluded that
he had been entrapped by the State's agent, Diamond, as a matter of
law.118
The supreme court, however, affirmed Hunter's conviction:
Although Diamond's acts amounted to entrapment of Conklin, the
middleman, he had minimal telephone contacts with Hunter. When
a middleman, not a state agent, induces another person to engage
in a crime, entrapment is not an available defense. " 9
2. Entitlement to Jury Instruction
In a separate case, Wilson v. State,120 the supreme court held that
where evidence exists to support a defendant's claim of entrapment, a
request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment "should be
refused only if the defendant has denied under oath the acts constitut-
ing the crime that is charged." '21 In Wilson, the defendant was
charged with sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to
sell, after allegedly selling a twenty dollar piece of crack cocaine to an
undercover police officer. Wilson testified under oath all of the factual
allegations concerning his arrest were untrue, and that another man
was actually responsible for the offenses. Under these circumstances,
the supreme court determined that Wilson was not entitled to an in-
117. See generally FLA. STAT. § 893.135(3) (1985).
118. Hunter, 586 So. 2d at 322.
119. Id. In dicta, the supreme court stated that defendants may not vicariously
assert due process violations suffered by third persons. Therefore, to the extent that a
third party is the victim of outrageous police conduct, rising to the level of a due pro-
cess violation, others who are induced to commit crimes based upon the third party's
actions have no standing to raise constitutional challenges. See State v. Glosson, 462
So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
120. 577 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1991).
121. Id. at 1302.
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struction on the defense of entrapment. However, the supreme court
recognized that "there are some circumstances under which a defend-
ant who claims entrapment may deny commission of the crime without
necessarily committing perjury." ' In these instances, an entrapment
instruction is appropriate. 123
B. Self-Defense
Under section 776.041(1), Florida Statutes, 24 the defense of self-
defense is not available to defendants charged with a "forcible felony,"
as enumerated in section 776.08, Florida Statutes. That section con-
tains a laundry list of "forcible felony" offenses, along with the proviso
that a "forcible felony" includes "any other felony which involves the
use of threat or physical force or violence against any individual. 1 25
In Perkins v. State,' the defendant, Marcus Perkins, was
charged. with attempted trafficking in cocaine, and first degree murder,
for the death of Anthony Kimble. On the date of Kimble's death, Per-
kins arranged to purchase cocaine from Kimble in exchange for
$11,000. At the transaction Kimble failed to bring any cocaine, and
instead, demanded Perkins' money at gun-point. A struggle ensued,
and Kimble shot Perkins. Although injured, Perkins somehow took the
firearm from Kimble, and fatally wounded him.'2"
In pre-trial proceedings, the State agreed that Perkins acted in
self-defense, but argued that Perkins was prohibited from raising self-
defense as a defense, based upon the State's contention that trafficking
in cocaine is a "forcible felony" for purposes of section 776.08.128 The
122. Id. at 1301.
123. Id. The supreme court cited several cases as examples of instances where a
defendant could properly claim entrapment and at the same time still deny the com-
mission of any criminal act, without committing perjury. Mathews v. United States,
485 U.S. 58 (1988); United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984); Stripling v.
State, 349 So. 2d ,187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert denied, 359 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.
1978).
124. FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (1989) provides, in part, that the defense of self
defense is not available to a person who: "(1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or
escaping after the commission of a forcible felony . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
125. FLA. STAT. § 776.04(1) (1987).
126. 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991).
127. Id. at 1311.
128. Id. FLA. STAT. § 776.08 (1987) provides:
"Forcible felony" means treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery;
robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated bat-
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Florida Supreme Court disagreed based upon their conclusion that "a
'forcible felony' under the final clause of section 776.08 is a felony
whose statutory elements include the use or threat of physical force or
violence against any individual." Drug trafficking fails to meet this
definition.129
C. Double Jeopardy
In Grady v. Corbin,'"0 the United States Supreme Court clarified
the coverage provided by the double jeopardy clause of the United
States Constitution"' by holding that double jeopardy prohibits a sec-
ond prosecution if, "to establish an essential element of an offense
charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prose-
cuted." 3 The United States Supreme Court indicated that double
jeopardy clause analysis necessitates a two-part test. First, the trial
court must apply the analysis articulated in Blockburger v. United
States." ' This stage is commonly referred to as the "traditional Block-
burger test.' 3 4
If application of that test reveals that the offenses have identical
statutory elements or that one is a lesser included offense of the
tery; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a de-
structive device or bomb; any other felony which involves the use or threat
of physical force or violence against any individual.
129. Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1313. The supreme court conceded that neither trea-
son or burglary meet this definition either, although each is designated as a "forcible
felony" in section 776.08. Nevertheless, it reiterated that due process concerns require
"that penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter." Id. (citing
State v. Jackson, 526 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1988); State ex rel. Cherry v. Davidson, 139 So.
177 (1931); Ex parte Bailey, 23 So. 552 (1897)). The Court concluded that the offense
of drug trafficking does not inherently "involve" the use or threat of physical force or
violence on every occasion, as required by section 776.08, although, obviously, drug
trafficking offenses are sometimes violent. Id. at 1313.
130. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
131. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, §
9. The Double Jeopardy Clause is enforceable against the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
132. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2087.
133. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
134. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2090.
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other, then the inquiry must cease, and the subsequent prosecution
is barred. 135
However, the Court indicated, "a subsequent prosecution must do
more than merely survive the Blockburger test."'13 6
[Tihe Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in
which the government, to establish an essential element of an of-
fense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that consti-
tutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prose-
cuted. This is not an "actual evidence" or "same evidence" test.
The critical inquiry is what conduct the State will prove, not the
evidence the State will use to prove that conduct.3 17
135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 2093.
137. Id. The Court indicated that this secondary inquiry had its genesis in the
Court's opinion in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
Factually, Grady v. Corbin concerned a traffic fatality. The State of New York
first successfully prosecuted the defendant, Thomas Corbin, for various traffic offenses.
In separate a prosecution, the defendant was subsequently charged with a more serious
manslaughter offense, stemming from the same conduct.
In its Double Jeopardy Clause analysis, the United States Supreme Court relied
heavily upon a bill of particulars filed by the State of New York prior to Corbin's trial
on the charge of reckless manslaughter. The bill of particulars revealed that the same
traffic violations for which the defendant had already plead guilty would again be re-
lied upon by the State as predicate offenses for proving the defendant's recklessness in
the manslaughter charge.
Although the elements of the offenses survived the traditional Blockburger analy-
sis, the Court concluded that the same conduct was being relied upon by the prosecu-
tion in the defendant's subsequent case, thereby violating the second prong of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Relying on the bill of particulars filed by the State of New
York, the Court concluded:
By its own pleadings, the State has admitted that it will prove the entirety
of the conduct for which Corbin was convicted-driving while intoxicated
and failing to keep right of the median-to establish essential elements of
the homicide and assault charges. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars this successive prosecution.
Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
The Court was aware of the additional burdens their holding would place on pros-
ecuting agencies. The Court noted that "[p]rosecutors' offices are often overworked and
may not always have the time to monitor seemingly minor cases as they wind through
the judicial system." Id. at 2095. However, the Court concluded that "these facts can-
not excuse the need for scrupulous adherence to our constitutional principles." Id. (cit-
ing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)).
1991]
25
Koerner: Criminal Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Grady v. Corbin
has had an immediate impact on Florida Courts. Most importantly, in
Scalf v. State,3 8 the First District Court of Appeal properly recognized
that Grady may be at variance with section 775.021(4)(b), Florida
Statutes," 9 as well as the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Smith." 0 Relying upon Grady v. Corbin, several district courts of ap-
peal decisions have barred subsequent prosecutions on double jeopardy
clause grounds."" However, at least one district court opinion success-
fully distinguished Grady v. Corbin, and sustained a second prosecution
for an offense arising from previously prosecuted conduct." 2
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL OFFENSES
A. Aggravated Battery
In Lareau v. State,"3 the Florida Supreme Court concluded that
the offense of aggravated battery, resulting in great bodily harm, per-
manent disability, or permanent disfigurement, contrary to section
784.045(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes,"4 when committed with a
138. 573 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
139. The appeals court in Scalf stated:
In reaching our conclusion we acknowledge that our disposition of this case
may be at variance with certain language set forth in Section
775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), as approved in State v.
Smith, 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989), in that the statute provides that it is
the legislature's intent to "convict and sentence for each criminal offense."
If the legislature intended to permit a successive prosecution based on con-
duct that constituted an offense for which the defendant had previously
been prosecuted, any such intent would no doubt be forced to give way to
the interpretation placed on the Double Jeopardy clause by the United
States Supreme Court.
Scalf, 573 So. 2d at 204 n.5 (emphasis in original).
140. 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989).
141. Scalf v. State, 573 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Dixon v.
State, 584 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Anderson v. State, 570 So. 2d
1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
142. Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In Walls, the
court factually distinguished the holding in Grady v. Corbin, and approved a second
prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, even though the defendant
had previously been convicted of grand theft of the same firearm and armed burglary.
143. 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991).
144. FLA. STAT. § 784.045 (1989) provides:
(1) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:
[Vol. 16
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weapon or firearm, may properly be reclassified as a felony of the first
degree, pursuant to the enhancement provision contained in section
775.087(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes. 45 The supreme court found this
result gives full effect to both section 784.045(l)(a) and the enhance-
ment provision of 775.087(1)(b), and additionally, conforms with the
legislative intent of providing increased punishments for violent crimi-
nal acts perpetrated with a firearm, or other weapon.146
In an unrelated case, State v. Nelson, 47 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of an information charging the offense
of aggravated battery upon a person 65 years of age or older, on the
grounds that the information failed to allege that the offense was car-
ried out "knowingly."' 48 The Nelson court concluded that the language
of section 784.08(2), Florida Statutes, 4" requires that the state prove
the defendant knew the victim was at least 65 years of age. 5
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disa-
bility, or permanent disfigurement; or
(b) Uses a deadly weapon.
(2) Whoever commits aggravated battery shall be guilty of a felony of the
second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084.
145. FLA. STAT. § 775.087 (1985) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, whenever a person is charged with a
felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essen-
tial element, and during the commission of such felony the defendant car-
ries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm, or
during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggra-
vated battery, the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassi-
fied as follows: ...
(b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, to a felony of the first
degree.
146. Lareau, 573 So. 2d at 815.
147. 577 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
148. Id. at 972.
149. FLA. STAT. § 784.08 (1989) provides in part:
(2) Whenever a person is charged with knowingly committing an assault
or aggravated assault or a battery or aggravated battery upon a person 65
years of age or older, the offense for which the person is charged shall be
reclassified as follows:
(a) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree
to a felony of the first degree.
150. Nelson, 577 So. 2d at 972.
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B. Aggravated Child Abuse
In State v. Gethers,151 the Fourth District Court of Appeal re-
jected the contention that the use of cocaine during pregnancy may
constitute aggravated child abuse, contrary to section 827.04(1), Flor-
ida Statutes. ' On the other hand, persons who ingest cocaine during
pregnancy might violate other statutory provisions.1 53
C. Controlled Substances
In Campbell v. State,""' the defendant was convicted of the offense
of trafficking in cocaine. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction after concluding that the defendant was entitled to
a special jury instruction concerning the issue of dominion or control,
based upon language in Graces v. State.'55
The defendant in Campbell was arrested in a reverse-sting opera-
tion -after negotiating the purchase of four kilos of cocaine from an
undercover police officer. Just prior to the completion of the transac-
tion, the defendant was permitted to inspect one of the four kilos of
cocaine while seated in the back seat of a car. The defendant placed
the kilo on his lap and examined its contents. After expressing satisfac-
tion with the cocaine, the defendant placed the kilo on the rear seat,
exited the vehicle, and was arrested.156
Based upon this factual scenario, the supreme court concluded
that the defendant was entitled to a special jury instruction on the issue
of dominion or control:
Temporary control of the contraband in the presence of its actual
owner, for the purpose of verifying that it is what it purports to be
151. 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
152. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1987) provides:
Whoever, willfully, or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows
a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical
treatment, or who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits physical
or mental injury to the child, and in so doing causes great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to such child, shall be
guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082,
s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
153. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
154. 577 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1991).
155. 485 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
156. Campbell, 577 So. 2d at 932-33.
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or to conduct a sensory test for quality, prior to the consummation
of the contemplated transaction, without more, does not constitute
legal possession."5 7
The supreme court also reiterated that "a judgment of acquittal is
proper where there is no evidence from which dominion or control can
be infe:rred.' 6
In an unrelated matter, the definition of a "school," for purposes
of section 893.13(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes, 15 9 relating to narcotics
offenses at or near schools, was decided in State v. Roland. 60 In that
case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that offenses occurring
near "kindergartens and preschools"''l are not subject to the enhance-
ment penalties provided in section 893.13(1)(e)(1) of the Florida Stat-
utes. " 2 The court determined that an elementary school, for purposes
of the statute, means the "first through sixth grades."' 3 However,
grade level is determined by performance level, not chronological
age.1
6 4
Finally, in Johnson v. State, 6 " the Fifth District Court of Appeal
157. Id. at 934 (emphasis in original) (quoting Garces v. State, 485 So. 2d 847,
848 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
158. Id. at 935.
159. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(l)(e) (Supp. 1990) provides in part:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to sell,
manufacture, or deliver, or to possess with intent to sell, purchase, manu-
facture, or deliver, a controlled substance in, on, or within 1,000 feet of the
real property comprising a public or private elementary, middle, or second-
ary school.
160. 577 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
161. Id. at 681.
162. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(l)(e)(1) (Supp. 1990) provides, in part, that persons
convicted of offenses occurring within 1000 feet of a school:
[S]hall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 calendar
years and shall not be eligible for parole or release under the Control Re-
lease Authority . . .or statutory gain-time . . . prior to serving such mini-
mum sentence.
163. Roland, 577 So. 2d at 681.
164. Compare State v. Edwards, 581 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(definition of school satisfied where one child was performing at the first grade level)
with State v. Lee, 583 So. 2d 1055, 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (school for
severely mentally handicapped and retarded persons, ages five to twenty-two years old;
not a school for purposes of enhancement statute where "the students have a minimal
I.Q. and function below the level of a two year old").
165. 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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determined that a pregnant person who ingests cocaine may violate sec-
tion 893.13(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes,1" concerning the delivery of
controlled substances to minors. Under the theory advanced in John-
son, the criminal act occurs at the moment of birth:
Appellant voluntarily took cocaine into her body, knowing it would
pass to her fetus and knowing (or should have known) that birth
was imminent. She is deemed to know that an infant at birth is a
person, and a minor, and that delivery of cocaine to the infant is
illegal. We can reach no other conclusion logically. 1 7
The court concluded that it was "singularly unimpressed" with "what
pregnant mothers might resort to if they know they may be charged
with this crime."'"
D. Driving Under the Influence
Section 316.193(1)(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that any per-
son convicted of a fourth or subsequent offense of driving under the
influence is guilty of a third degree felony. 169 In State v. Rodriguez,17 0
the Florida Supreme Court determined that in order to invoke the ju-
risdiction of the circuit court, an information alleging the offense of
felony driving under the influence must "unambiguously" charge a fel-
ony. 7 ' The supreme court concluded that reference in the information
to section 316.193(l)(2)(b) was sufficient for this purpose. 72
However, to comply with due process requirements, the supreme
court held that the charging document must specifically allege each
predicate DUI offense. 73 Therefore, to the extent that a jury is pro-
vided with a copy of the information during its deliberations, any refer-
166. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(c) (1987) provides in part: "Except as authorized
by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to deliver any
controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years."
167. Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 420.
168. Id.
169. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1)(2)(b) (Supp. 1988) provides: "Any person who is
convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of subsection (1) is guilty of a felony of
the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084."
170. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991).
171. Id. at 1264.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1266.
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ence to the predicate offenses must be redacted.' 7 4
Additionally, in the event that a verdict of guilty is obtained, the
supreme court's decision in Rodriguez directs that the trial court, sit-
ting as fact-finder, "shall" conduct a separate evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the defendant has, in fact, been previously convicted
of DUI on three or more occasions. The State bears the burden of prov-
ing the existence of the predicate offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt. 171
In a related issue, the supreme court held in Had v. State,1 76 that
an uncounseled DUI conviction may serve as a predicate offense in a
prosecution for felony driving under the influence, but only if the maxi-
mum penalty for the prior offense was no greater than six months in-
carceration, and the defendant was not actually incarcerated as a result
of the conviction. 17 This bright-line test expressly approves the analysis
urged by United States Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun in
Baldasar v. Illinois.178
Finally, in State v. Reisner,17 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
found Rules 1OD-42.023 80 and 1OD-42.024' 8' of the Florida Adminis-
trative Code, relating to chemical breath testing, unconstitutionally
void for vagueness. Section 316.1932(1)(f)(1) of the Florida Statutes
requires the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to im-
plement rules governing the administration of all chemical breath test-
ing in the State of Florida." 2 The results of a chemical breath test are
174. Id.
175. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1266.
176. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S586 (Fla. 1991).
177. Id. at S586.
178. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (Blackmun, J. concurring).
179. 584 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
180. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.1OD-42.023 (1990) governing the registration
and yearly testing of chemical breath test instruments provides in part: "All such
chemical tests, instruments or devices registered hereunder shall be checked at least
once each calendar year (January 1 through December 31) for accuracy and reproduc-
ibility." (emphasis added).
181. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1OD-42.024(1)(c) (1990), governing the
monthly maintenance of chemical breath test instruments, provides:
Chemical tests, instruments and devices used in the breath test method
shall be inspected at least once each calendar month by a technician to
ensure general cleanliness, appearance, and accuracy.
Id. (emphasis added).
182. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(l)(f)1 (Supp. 1988) provides in part: "The tests de-
termining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be administered at the
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inadmissible in a criminal proceeding " if the testing procedures fail to
substantially comply with section 316.1932,84 and the applicable ad-
ministrative rules.1 85 Pursuant to section 316.1932((1)(f)(1):
Such rules and regulations shall be adopted after public hearing,
shall specify precisely the test or tests which are approved by the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for reliability of
result and facility of administration which shall be followed in all
such tests given under this section. "
In Reisner, the court determined that the rules and incorporated
forms promulgated to maintain the "accuracy" and "reproducibility"
of chemical breath test machines failed to define those terms ade-
quately, and were unconstitutionally void for vagueness. 8 , Therefore,
the court excluded the results of the defendant's chemical breath test.
request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules and regula-
tions which shall have been adopted by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services." (emphasis added).
183. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(l)(f)(1) (Supp. 1988) provides in part: "The tests
determining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be administered at the
request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules and regula-
tions which shall have been adopted by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services." (emphasis added). But see State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 1980)
("[T]he results of blood alcohol tests are admissible into evidence without compliance
with the administrative rules if the traditional predicate is laid which establishes the
reliability of the test, the qualifications of the operator, and the meaning of the test
results by expert testimony.").
184. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(l)(b) (Supp. 1988) provides:
An analysis of a person's breath, in order to be considered valid under this
section, must have been performed substantially according to methods ap-
proved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. For this
purpose, the department is authorized to approve satisfactory techniques or
methods. Any insubstantial differences between approved techniques and
actual testing procedures in any individual case shall not render the test or
test results invalid.
(emphasis added). FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(f)(1) (Supp. 1988) provides in part: "The
tests determining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be administered
at the request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules and
regulations which shall have been adopted by the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services." (emphasis added).
185. See supra notes 180-81.
186. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932((1)(f)(1) (Supp. 1988).
187. State v. Reisner, 584 So. 2d 141, 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
State v. Cumming, 365 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1978)).
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E. Grand Theft
In State v. G.C.,'88 the Florida Supreme Court held that "mere
presence as an after-acquired passenger in a vehicle, with knowledge
that it has been stolen,"' 189 was insufficient to sustain a conviction for
the offense of grand theft. 9 ' The facts revealed that G.C., a fourteen-
year-old juvenile, accepted a ride in a stolen vehicle. The defendant
admitted that he suspected the car was stolen due to the fact that the
vehicle's steering column was broken.'
However, unlike the driver of a stolen car, the supreme court de-
termined that the defendant's mere presence as a passenger was insuffi-
cient evidence to prove "possession, dominion, or control" over the vehi-
cle.' 92 The supreme court distinguished the defendant's "use" from the
specific: intent to either temporarily or permanently "deprive" or "ap-
propriate" the property of another.19 3 To prove the "taking," the G.C.
188. 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1991).
189. Id. at 1382.
190. FLA. STAT. § 812.014 (1987) provides in part:
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors
to obtain or use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily
or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit
therefrom.
(b) Appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not
entitled thereto.
FLA. STAT. § 812.012 (1987) provides in part:
(2) "Obtains or uses" means any manner of:
(a) Taking or exercising control over property.
(b) Making any unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of property.
(c) Obtaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a future act,
or false promise.
(d) l. Conduct previously known as stealing; larceny; purloining; abstract-
ing; embezzlement; misapplication; misappropriation; conversion; or ob-
taining money or property by false pretenses, fraud, or deception; or
2. Other conduct similar in nature.
191. G.C., 572 So. 2d at 1380-81.
192. Id. at 1382.
193. Id. at 1381. The supreme court concluded, however, that the defendant's
unauthorized entry into the stolen motor vehicle constituted the offense of trespass to a
conveyance, contrary to FLA. STAT. § 810.08(1) (1987) which provides:
Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters or
remains in any structure or conveyance, or, having been authorized, li-
censed, or invited, is warned by the owner or lessee of the premises, or by a
person authorized by the owner or lessee, to depart and refuses to do so,
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court concluded that proof of a specific intent to commit the offense of
theft is necessary. This, the supreme court suggested, requires "some
active step" on the part of the defendant beyond merely riding in the
vehicle as a passenger.
19 4
F. Keeping a House of Ill Fame
In Warren v. State,195 the Florida Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of section 796.01, Florida Statutes.'96 Finding the
term "ill fame" unconstitutionality vague, the court declared the stat-
ute unconstitutional. Although the supreme court concluded that the
term "ill fame" may have provided sufficient notice of prohibited con-
duct in the past, it was nevertheless persuaded that in today's society,
the term fails to provide sufficient notice between permitted and pro-
hibited conduct.197
commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance.
194. G.C., 572 So. 2d at 1381-82; see State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla.
1978).
195. 572 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1991).
196. FLA. STAT. § 796.01 (1987) provides: "Whoever keeps a house of ill fame,
resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, is guilty of a felony of the third
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." On the other
hand, FLA. STAT. § 796.07 (1987) provides in part:
(2) It is unlawful in the state:
(a) To keep, set up, maintain, or operate any place, structure, building, or
conveyance for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution.
(5) Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or s. 775.084.
According to the Warren court, "'[i]ll fame' is the element that distinguishes the fel-
ony prohibited by § 796.01, Fla. Stat. (1987), from the misdemeanor prohibited by §
796.07(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987)." Warren, 572 So. 2d at 1377 n.3.
197. Warren, 572 So. 2d at 1377. The supreme court in Warren conceded that
"[w]hile the general population might have understood the meaning of 'ill fame' a cen-
tury ago, the lack of definition in the statutes, jury instructions, and cases is fatal to its
continued validity." Id.
The term "Ill fame" is defined by one source as follows: "Evil repute; notorious
bad character. Houses of prostitution, gaming houses, and other such disorderly places
are called 'houses of ill fame,' and a person who frequents them a person of ill fame."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (5th ed. 1979).
The Warren court made special reference to the frustrations of one prosecutor,
who, referring to the term "ill fame," unabashedly stated: "'How are we going to
prove that element, what witnesses are we going to use?" Warren, 572 So. 2d at 1377
(citing to State v. Warren, 558 So. 2d 55, 58 n.4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (quot-
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G. Robbery
Section 812.13, of the Florida Statutes, defines the offense of rob-
bery.' 98 The element of "taking," for purposes of section 812.13, is de-
fined in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions as one of the four ele-
ments necessary to prove the offense of robbery. This element requires
proof that:
The taking was with the intent to permanently [deprive (victim) of
his right to the property or any benefit from it.] [appropriate the
property of (victim) to his own use or to the use of any person not
entitled to it.] 1
In Daniels v. State,200 the Florida Supreme Court held that "the spe-
cific intent to commit robbery is the intent to steal, i.e., to deprive an
owner of property either permanently or temporarily."'0 By holding
that the specific intent to commit robbery is either the permanent or
temporary deprivation of the property of another, the supreme court's
opinion in Daniels expands the definition of "taking,"20 2 and necessa-
ing an unpublished portion of the trial court record in State v. Palmieri, 558 So. 2d 53
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, Palmieri v. State, 572 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1991)).
198. FLA. STAT. § 812.13 (1989) provides in part: "(1) 'Robbery' means the tak-
ing of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or
custody of another when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence,
assault, or putting in fear."
199. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 155 (The
Florida Bar 1989).
200. 587 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1991).
201. Id. at 462.
202. The supreme court's determination in Daniels that the "taking" may be
temporary or permanent was based on a 1977 legislative amendment to chapter 812.
Id.; see Chapter 77-342, Laws of Florida, codified at FLA. STAT. § 812.014 (concerning
the offense of theft). That revision changed the language of the theft statute, in part,
by adding the words "temporarily or permanently" to subsection 812.014(1).
In State v. Denumann, 427 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1983), the Florida Supreme Court
suggested in dicta that the 1977 legislative amendment had no impact on section
812.13, relating to the offense of robbery. Id. at 169. Daniels specifically recedes from
that portion of Denumann. Daniels, 587 So. 2d at 462.
Additionally, in State v. Bell, 394 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1991), the following question
was certified: "Whether specific intent (i.e., the intent to permanently deprive the
owner of property) is still a requisite element of the crime of robbery as now defined by
Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1975)." Id. at 979 (emphasis added). The supreme
court answered the question in the affirmative, stating: "We hold that specific intent is
still a requisite element of the crime of robbery." Id. at 980.
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rily amends the appropriate jury instruction when the offense of rob-
bery is alleged.
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court's numerous decisions in the area of
sentencing, and the guidelines, continues to provide much needed re-
finement. Most, but not all, of the supreme court's sentencing decisions
conceived reasonably appropriate solutions to difficult problems. In
other instances, however, the supreme court's efforts failed to provide
adequate guidance
In particular, the supreme court has again failed to clearly define
what constitutes a continuing and persistent patterns of criminal con-
duct. Similarly, the test announced by the supreme court in Clark v.
State,0 concerning consolidated sentencing hearings, seems certain to
foster numerous appeals.
Other important sentencing issues appear on the horizon, as well.
One area which seems especially ripe for review concerns matters relat-
ing to the sentencing of habitual felony offenders. In the final analysis,
then, it appears that as long as the sentencing guidelines remain in
existence, there will be a fresh supply of criminal law cases to decipher
and digest, and most importantly, to survey.
Based upon the manner in which the certified question in Bell was phrased, the
supreme court's answer to the certified question reasonably suggested that the specific
intent necessary to commit the offense of robbery included "permanent" deprivation.
To this extent, the supreme court's decision in Daniels recedes from the language con-
tained within the parenthetical portion of the certified question in Bell. Daniels, 587
So. 2d at 462.
203. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
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